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I. INTRODUCTION  
Science helps mankind to understand the world and to ease human lives. It is an 
undeniable fact that the biggest supporters of science were kings, lords, bureaucrats, or in 
short, governments. One of the most important motivational factors for such support was 
to acquire better weapon systems and it worked. Scientists developed new and better 
weapons, and governments used these weapons in wars, defense structures and 
dominance strategies. It is fair to say that this quest also helps humanity in different 
aspects of life. Some examples from recent history include the development of nuclear 
weapons, the development of computers (i.e., ENIAC) for flight calculations in missile 
projectiles, and so forth. The development of nuclear weapons made it possible to benefit 
from nuclear energy while the development of computers and transistors created benefits 
arising from the substantial automation occurring in almost every field of human 
practices. Therefore, this thesis, states that such a quest to develop better weapon systems 
software will also be beneficial to other systems software.  
Today, a regrettable belief about computers is that computer systems break 
frequently. This view may be true for daily life, but for safety-critical systems, and 
especially for weapon systems, such failures are completely unacceptable. Generally, the 
failure of a safety-critical system will endanger a human life or lives. Most weapon 
systems are in the category of safety-critical systems. Thus, the development of weapon 
systems is an expensive and thorough process, which poses many challenges. This thesis 
will address one aspect of the development process challenges: the capturing of the 
system requirements with complete correctness, without omissions, and the easing of the 
verification of specifications using a formal specification language. 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze a formal visual specification language called 
“TLCharts” [1], proposed by Drusinsky, in the context of weapon systems software 
development. TLCharts is a hybrid of Harel Statecharts [2] and temporal logic. The thesis 
includes a case study to compare the results with a well-known and widely-used visual 
specification language, Statecharts. This case study is a homing torpedo, named “KTorp”.   
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Conclusions drawn from developing the torpedo system in both methods and comparing 
the correctness, expressiveness, and effectiveness of capturing the system behavior will 
finalize the study. 
The weapon systems development process will be explained in Chapter II. This 
chapter will also address the challenges in the development and will briefly explain the 
methods used to ease the challenges. 
As mentioned earlier, TLCharts is a hybrid of Harel Statecharts and temporal 
logic. Statecharts and temporal logic are both a type of formal specification language. 
Chapters III and IV will provide a background on temporal logic and Statecharts. This 
background will help to analyze and compare TLCharts with these specification 
languages. 
Chapter V will define KTorp, a fictitious homing torpedo system. The 
requirements for the system will be derived from the system definition and use cases. 
System sequence diagrams derived from use cases will be included. Using the use cases 
and system sequence diagrams, the statechart of the homing torpedo system will be 
developed. Then, the system will be specified using TLCharts.  



















II. WEAPON SYSTEMS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
The main activities related to software development are the same regardless of the 
type of software. However, the type of software affects the rigorousness of the phases 
within the development. Some systems software such as safety-critical real-time reactive 
systems software development pose many challenges [3] and most weapon systems 
software are actually this type. In addition to these challenges, weapon systems software 
incorporates others. The goal of this chapter is to identify these differences from a 
commercial software development process. 
First, the main activities of the software development process will be explained 
briefly. Next, widely-accepted software life-cycle models will be introduced. Finally, the 
chapter will end with the identified differences between weapon systems software 
development and other software development. It is important to note that there is little 
available published work on the subject of weapon systems software development. 
Therefore, this chapter introduces the subject and identifies the need for more detailed 
analysis which may be a prospective thesis subject. 
A. SOFTWARE PROCESS 
The software process is the way to produce software. It incorporates all the 
activities related to software life cycle as well as the tools used and the individuals 
building the software [4]. Regardless of the software type, the software process involves 
eight main phases: concept exploration, requirements analysis, specification, design, 
implementation, integration, maintenance, and retirement. Activities within these phases 
and transitions from one phase to another are defined with software life-cycle models and 
vary within models. The readers familiar with the software development process may 
argue that some of the main activities are missing from the list: testing and 
documentation. In fact, these activities are not missing; they are already incorporated into 
every phase. These activities will be discussed separately. 
Considering the software separate from a system or disregarding the underlying 
hardware will lead to a false approach in systems context. Thus, it is important to keep in 
mind that the phases explained here must be thought of as system development phases.  
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1. Concept Exploration Phase 
Many software engineering textbooks do not address concept exploration as a 
separate phase. However, the activities related to this phase require special attention. 
Some textbooks mention this phase within requirements analysis and this approach is 
partly true because some activities are overlapping. Nonetheless, some activities such as 
developing a technology that will make the system more effective or cheaper are not 
directly related to requirements. 
The concept exploration phase involves activities related to the investigation of 
risky areas within the development. In this phase, key enabling technologies and features 
are researched, analyzed, and even validated in some developments. Developers 
responsible for various phases brainstorm about the concepts and processes that will 
bring the system to life. Strategies and approaches are identified to attack risky areas. 
Precautions are acknowledged to meet the budget and schedule. Also in some cases, the 
tools and techniques to be used in the development process are considered. A good 
example of this supportive task is observed within the development of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS). 
This phase is crucial for complex systems, which is usually the case for weapon 
systems. The reason is that complex systems may present some hidden challenges and 
often these challenges are not obvious initially. 
2. Requirements Analysis Phase 
In this phase, the developers identify the requirements of the system. Mainly, the 
requirements are extracted from stakeholders. A stakeholder is an individual, an entity, or 
a regulation that has expectations from a system in one way or another. For a missile 
system, stakeholders are the branch of military service, the government, the personnel 
who will use the system, the military standards, or the environment. Some requirements 
do not derive from stakeholders but are enforced by the way the software is produced or 




In short, requirements analysis is the agreement between the developer and the 
stakeholders about what the system should accomplish. It is the developers’ responsibility 
to differentiate what the customer wants and needs and even renegotiate the 
requirements.  
Requirements analysis is the most important phase of any software development, 
because the most costly errors are introduced during this phase. Fixing a requirement 
error drastically increases in later phases. 
3. Specification Phase 
After the customer and the developer agree on what the system should do, the 
specification document is prepared. The methods used in the requirements phase are 
generally informal or semi-formal. In the specification phase, the methods are more 
formal and the outputs should be as clear as possible. In this phase, the functionalities of 
the product are explicitly identified, and documented. The specifications may be in 
natural language. For weapon systems software, in most cases, they are also formalized. 
The formalization is in the form of some specification language. There are many 
specification languages. Examples include Z, VDM, Temporal Logic, Statecharts, and 
SPEC. [ 2, 27, 39, 40]  
There are many automated tools associated with formal specification languages. 
Many of these tools incorporate automatic syntactic checking and documentation aids.  
Therefore, using a formal specification language allows developers to verify that there 
are no inconsistent declarations in the specification. However, semantic checks of 
specifications still require human analysis.  
Formal or semi-formal specifications should not be ambiguous, incomplete, and 
contradictory. Also, specifications must be traceable to requirements. Formal 
specification helps transition to the design phase from the requirements phase in a 
methodological manner. 
4. Design Phase 
The specification identifies what the system does while the design clarifies how 
the system performs [4]. Using the specification as an input, the design team creates a 
design. The designers decompose the system into modules. This decomposition is 
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sometimes called architectural design. Then, the design team works on each module, and 
identifies the details of the modules. The final product of this work is called detailed 
design. These designs form an input for the implementation.   
Design reviews are an important part of this phase. In these reviews, the design is 
checked according to the specifications. 
5. Implementation Phase 
Coding of system modules is the main activity of this phase. The coding activity 
should be fairly simple, if the previous phases are well achieved. Sometimes the choice of 
programming language may become an issue in this phase, but this selection is better 
done in the concept exploration phase. Every programming language is designed for 
some purpose. Several may not be suitable for some projects. The right tool for the right 
job leads to success. For example, the programming language of choice for a large 
portion of weapons system software was Ada and still is. Ada possesses several built in 
features such as strong-type checking, which enforces good programming practices.  
After enough modules are implemented, the developers begin to integrate the 
system. Code reviews are found to be useful in many successful projects.  
6. Integration Phase 
The integration phase is the phase in which the system modules are combined to 
form the system. In theory, if the previous phases are quite successful, this phase should 
be straightforward. Generally, however, this is not the case. A large number of errors 
surface in the integration phase. Fixing some of these errors even requires returning to the 
requirements phase, which may affect a significant portion of the product. Weapon 
systems are usually complex systems. The integration of complex systems poses many 
challenges and the solution to these challenges lies in the good business practices during 
the previous phases. 
After integration, the system is deployed. Deployment is also another difficult 
task for many weapon systems. The main reason behind the difficulty is that it is very 
hard to create the environment of the system in a laboratory setting, which limits the 
testing of the system under real conditions.  
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7. Maintenance Phase 
After the system is deployed and accepted by the customer, all the changes made 
to the system are considered maintenance phase activities. A significant portion of 
software life cycle costs is devoted to the maintenance phase. This portion can reach up 
to 80% for many organizations [5]. It is obvious that the longer the life cycle, the higher 
the maintenance costs. The life cycle of the weapon systems is generally longer compared 
to commercial systems, which increases the importance of maintenance activities for 
weapon systems software. 
There are three types of maintenance: corrective, perfective, and adaptive. Fixing 
faults after development due to specification faults, design faults or any other type  of 
faults is called corrective maintenance. Increasing the effectiveness of software is called 
perfective maintenance. Sometimes, the environment of the software product changes; 
therefore the product may have to be ported to a new compiler, a new operating system or 
new hardware. This type of maintenance is called adaptive maintenance.  
The importance of software maintenance within software life cycle management 
is unquestionable. However, to improve software maintenance activities, earlier phases of 
software development must be improved. 
8. Retirement 
After years of service, the system will come to a point that maintenance is no 
longer cost-effective. Some reasons are: 
• The environment of the system is so different that modifications are too 
expensive. 
• The proposed changes may require a major design effort that is too costly. 
• The documentation is not updated as necessary; therefore maintenance is 
becoming too costly. 
• The system is no longer useful and incapable of satisfying the current 
mission needs. 
Retirement of weapon systems may be an important issue, which is different than 
many commercial systems. For example, some weapon systems use radioactive materials 
and the disposal of these materials necessitates cautious consideration. Retirement may 
require careful planning, which should be done in steps. The plan should consider the 
effects of removing components on the systems safety.  
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9. Testing 
It is important to note that software testing has a special definition: 
Testing is the process of executing a program/system with the intent of 
finding errors. [6] 
In the context of this thesis, verification, validation, and software testing activities 
are discussed under the title of testing. Therefore, it is not incorrect to stress that each 
phase should incorporate some of the activities under this title.   
In many software life cycle models, testing is a separate phase, which is 
conducted after the implementation or integration phases. This approach has many 
drawbacks. Software development is an expensive activity and the discovery of errors 
late in the process will be costly. Therefore, testing should be conducted at any point 
possible. In the requirements analysis phase, the requirements should be validated with 
the customers. In the specifications phase, the specifications should be verified and 
validated according to requirements and similar activities should be conducted for the rest 
of the software process. Every effort to find an error in any phase prior to advancement to 
next phase is valuable and definitely a cost-effective effort.  
10. Documentation 
The importance of documentation is almost unquestionable. For example, one of 
the main problems with the maintenance phase is inadequate documentation or a lack of 
documentation. It was mentioned earlier that software maintenance cost can reach up to 
80% of the software life-cycle cost. As a result, documentation considerably affects the 
cost of the software life cycle. However, the pressure of delivering the product on time 
and within budget often negatively affects documentation efforts. Thus, documentation 
becomes a secondary priority whereas it should have the same priority as the delivery of 
a success product.  
One of the main goals of computer-aided software development is implicit 





Documentation significantly affects weapon systems software development more. 
The reason lies in the necessity of conforming to the standards set by the government. 
This has quality considerations as well as cost considerations. The details will be 
discussed later in the thesis.  
B. CAPABILITY MATURITY MODELS 
The software crisis has attracted a lot of attention in the last three decades. 
Incomplete projects, cost and schedule overruns, and unsuccessful systems have become 
a major concern due to the increased use of software intensive systems in every aspect of 
life. In 1987, U.S. Department of Defense reported: 
After two decades of largely unfulfilled promises about productivity and 
quality gains from applying new software methodologies and 
technologies, industry and government organizations are realizing that 
their fundamental problem is the inability to manage the software process. 
[7] 
DoD founded the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) due to related issues in 
December 1984. The institute resides at Carnegie Mellon University. One of the most 
important contributions of SEI is the Capability Maturity Model (CMM). There is also 
another international software process improvement effort by International Standards 
Organization, the ISO/IEC 15504.  
The capability maturity models include a variety of models: 
• CCM for software (SW-CMM) 
• CCM for management of human resources (P-CMM) 
• CCM for systems engineering (SE-CMM) 
• CCM for integrated product development (IPD-CMM) 
• CCM for software acquisition (SA-CMM) 
In 1997, it was decided to integrate some of these models into one common 
framework under the name capability maturity model integration (CCMI) [4]. SW-CMM 
focuses on improving the management of the software process. The intent is that a better 
product and better techniques will result from improving software process management. 
CMM identifies five maturity levels. The higher the maturity level, the better the 
development process. [8] 
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• Maturity Level 1. Initial Level: Being the lowest, this level indicates that 
no sound software engineering practices are in place. The software process 
is completely ad hoc and success is very much dependent on the existing 
staff.  
• Maturity Level 2. Repeatable Level: This level indicates that basic 
software management practices are in place. The experiences in similar 
projects are repeatable. Managers are proactive in determining problems 
and taking corrective actions. 
• Maturity Level 3. Defined Level: This level indicates that software 
process is fully documented. Technical and managerial aspects of projects 
are clearly defined. Reviews for quality assurance are in place and the 
software process is analyzable. Therefore, the software process is open to 
improvements. 
• Maturity Level 4. Managed Level: Levels 4 and 5 are only reached by 
very few organizations. In level 4, organizations have clear goals about 
quality and productivity. These goals are monitored continually. 
Quantitative measurements guide the improvements for quality and 
productivity goals. The software process is managed.  
• Maturity Level 5. Optimizing Level: This level is the highest level in 
SW-CMM. The goal at this level is continuous improvement of the 
software process. The experience gained in each project is analyzed and 
utilized for future projects. Level 5 incorporates this positive feedback 
loop to optimize the software process.   
Figure II-1 shows the five levels of SW-CMM taken from Software Process Self-
Assessment Training Participant’s Guide, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie 




Figure II-1. Five Levels of SW-CMM 
 
C. SOFTWARE LIFE-CYCLE MODELS 
The series of steps for each software product as it progresses is called a software 
life-cycle model [4]. Basically, a software product begins as a conceptual idea. Next, the 
requirements for the realization of the product are identified. The specifications and the 
design for the product are accomplished, forming an input for the implementation and 
integration. Deployment and maintenance are the following activities in the life of the 
product. The life cycle ends with retirement. Each software life-cycle model defines the 
necessary steps, the order and the interaction of the steps within the life cycle to 
accomplish the project successfully. 
The selection of the life-cycle model depends on various factors. The main factors 
are the type of software and the practices used by the organization. Many software life-
cycle models were proposed in the past but only a few were used effectively and gained 
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attention. Only the most commonly used models for weapon systems software 
development will be explained in this thesis. 
1. Waterfall Model 
The waterfall model was the only widely accepted model until early 1980’s [4].  It 
was first recognized by W.W. Royce [9].  There are many variations of this basic model 
addressing some of the weaknesses. This model has been successfully used in many 
projects. It is important to note that using this model is not applicable to every type of 
software intensive system.  
The model basically starts with the identification of system requirements. These 
higher requirement analyses lead to software requirements. The analysis follows the 
software requirements. This phase can be mapped to the specification phase in a modern 
day model but it incorporates additional activities such as risk analysis. Program design is 
the phase in which the software architecture and the detailed design is accomplished. 
Coding, or in other words implementation, follows this phase. In the first versions of the 
model, integration is not a clear phase but it is an activity within coding. Testing of the 
software is the next step in the life-cycle model. Finally, the original model ends with the 
operations phase. This phase includes maintenance and retirement in a modern day 
model.  
Royce identifies two important concepts for the life-cycle model. The first one is 
the feedback with the previous phase. According to him, every phase must have a 
feedback loop with its preceding step. This feedback reduces the probability of errors 
passing into next step. The second important concept Royce emphasizes is the 
importance of documentation. He advised that all documentation should be completed 
before advancing to the next step in the life-cycle.  
In the original model, Royce introduced another step that is not commonly used 
today. That step is called “Preliminary Program Design” and includes designing a 
database and processors, a documenting system overview, allocating subroutine storage 
and subroutine execution times as well as describing operating procedures [9]. If the time 
period is considered, most of the technologies in place today were not used at that time.  
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Therefore, such an analysis called preliminary program design was a necessity. Today, 
with the use of advanced tools and techniques, most of these activities do not require a 
separate phase.  
A derivation of the original model proposed by Royce [9] is shown in Figure II-2. 
This figure is very close to Royce’s original model. Today, the names of the phases are 
modified and the model is known as the “Waterfall Life-cycle Model”. 
 
Figure II-2. Derivation of the Original Model Proposed by Royce [After 9] 
 
2. Incremental Model 
Software is a product that is built step by step. This process is often called the 
incremental process. This aspect of the software is captured by a life-cycle model called 
the “Incremental Model”. In this model, the software is built by a series of incremental 
builds. Every build captures one or more features of the product. Then, the build is added 
and the system is tested as a whole. 
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In the incremental model, the requirements are extracted at first. Afterwards, the 
system specification is prepared. An architectural design that will create the system is 
accomplished. Next, the developers separate the system into features satisfying a number 
of requirements. To implement one or more features is the goal of each build. The builds 
may be accomplished concurrently or one at a time depending on a specific system. Each 
build is tested and integrated into the system. Afterwards, the system is tested. This 
process continues until the product is finished.  
In this model, there is an operational-quality product at every stage, which 
satisfies a subset of the client’s requirements. A representation of an incremental model is 
given in Figure II-3 [4]. 
 
Figure II-3. Representation of the Incremental Model [After 4] 
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3. Spiral Model 
The spiral model [10] was proposed by B. W. Boehm in May 1988. Since that 
time, it has been widely recognized and used successfully. This model addresses one of 
the main issues observed in developing a complex large-scale system, which is risk. 
Basically in a spiral model, every phase starts with a risk analysis. If the risks are found 
to be unsolvable, then the project is canceled. Actually, this is only the case for in-house 
projects, but the risk analysis activity is useful for productivity. Therefore, the spiral 
model is also applicable to contracted projects. Another main issue addressed by the 
model is the difficulty of requirements extraction. Prototyping is the proposed solution to 
this problem in the spiral life-cycle model. 
The spiral model can be thought of as a waterfall model with the inclusion of risk 
analysis and prototyping at every phase. A representation of the spiral model is given in 
Figure II-4. In the figure, the radial dimension represents cumulative cost to date, and the 
angular dimension represents progress through the spiral. Each phase is represented by a 
spiral. Each phase starts with the left upper quadrant by determining the objectives, 
alternatives to those objectives, and constraints for alternatives. This activity results with 
a strategy. Afterwards, this strategy is analyzed with the associated risks. These risks are 
resolved and the phase enters into the right lower quadrant. This part of the spiral is 












Figure II-4. Full Spiral Model [From 10] 
 
The spiral model especially addresses the issues related to large-scale systems. It 
is mostly suitable for weapon systems software development due to the high risks 
associated with this type of project.  
D. CHALLENGES OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
It was previously mentioned that a significant portion of weapons systems are 
safety-critical real-time reactive systems. In today’s environment, these systems rely 
more and more on software-based components. Table II-1 shows the system functionality 
requiring software for a typical weapon system, which is combat aircraft. 
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Table II-1. System Functionality Requiring Software [From 11] 
 
This table simply shows the increasing importance of the software portion in a 
weapon systems development. The Crosstalk–Journal of Defense Software Engineering 
published an article entitled “Now More Than Ever, Software Is the Heart of Our 
Weapons Systems” in its January 2002 issue. This article provides examples of software 
intensive systems that increase the U.S.’s national defense capabilities. It is fair to say 
that the success of the weapon system is becoming merely dependent upon the success of 
the software portion of the system.  Therefore, this part of the thesis will analyze the 
challenges posed by military software and mostly will focus on the technical differences 
between military and commercial software.  
It is important to note that the software itself is not different whether it is military 
or commercial. However, the software process is not about the software only. It is about 
the manner in which the software is produced. Thus, the software process is seriously 
affected by the managerial aspects and these aspects influence the technical portion of 
software development.  
1. Definition of Weapons Systems Software 
The term weapon systems software is in fact self-explanatory. However, in 
literature, this term is not commonly used. Instead, the terms “Military Software” or 
“Defense Software” is generally used to encapsulate weapons systems software. The 
phrase “Defense Software” refers to software produced for a uniformed military service 
[19]. The term also includes software produced for the Department of Defense, or the 
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equivalent in other countries. An article by Capers Jones [19] provides a broad definition 
of defense software and the main attribute that distinguishes defense software from other 
types of software: 
The broad definition of defense software includes a number of subclasses 
such as software associated with weapons systems; with command, 
control, and communication systems (usually shortened to C3 or C cubed); 
with logistical  applications; and also with software virtually identical to 
civilian counterparts such as payroll applications, benefits tracking 
applications, and the like. The main attribute that distinguishes defense 
software from other types of software is adherence to military or DoD 
standards. 
In the context of this thesis, the term “Military Software” and “Defense Software” 
will be used interchangeably. When the term “Weapon Systems Software” is used, it will 
refer to software associated with weapons systems. Examples of these weapon systems 
include missiles, torpedoes, artillery systems, combat aircrafts, and fire control systems.  
2. General Characteristics of Weapons Systems Software Development 
The general characteristics of weapons systems software development is 
categorized under two titles in this thesis: technical and managerial characteristics. The 
technical characteristics refer to the issues related to the product itself and challenges 
imposed by these types of software. Managerial characteristics are inherent to the weapon 
systems software development environment. Weapons systems are built in-house by 
government branches or contracted to companies by governments. System acquisition in 
this context has significant overhead if compared to commercial systems acquisition.  
These issues are addressed under managerial characteristics. 
a.  Technical Characteristics of Weapon Systems Software 
Development 
At present, it is very hard to find a piece of weapon system software that is 
not safety-critical real-time reactive software. Also, many weapon systems are complex 
systems. Some of the main characteristics of weapon systems are as follows: 
• Real-Time Systems: Real-time systems are concurrent systems with 
timing constraints [16]. A real-time system generally consists of sensors, 
actuators, and real-time system core. Weapon systems are real-time 
systems. For example, a missile consists of sensors that capture signals 
from targets, actuators in wings that will help to navigate, and a decision-
making component which can be thought of as the real-time system core. 
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Meeting the timing constraints between these components poses 
significant challenges. Also, real-time systems require real-time control 
that is making control decisions based on input data, without any human 
intervention [16]. The development of such systems requires at least the 
use of formal methods, a well-developed architecture, an extensive design 
and testing efforts. 
• Safety-Critical Systems: A safety-critical system is a system whose failure 
may cause injury or death to human beings. Actually, weapon systems are 
intended to cause the destruction on targets. However, the key phrase in a 
weapon systems context is “to intended targets”. Therefore, weapon 
systems should not cause harm to its own users. For example, currently a 
torpedo is incapable of differentiating signals from a target or from the 
mother ship. Therefore, developers incorporate a feature in the design such 
arming after a safe distance. The failure of this feature may cause the 
torpedo to attack its mother ship. Ensuring the correct implementation of 
safety-criticality to weapon systems is another challenging part of weapon 
systems software development. Safety-critical aspects of systems are also 
shared by some commercial applications such as medical systems. 
• Mission-Critical Systems: Mission-critical systems are systems whose 
failure will cause significant loss in terms of money, trust, or defense 
capabilities of a nation or of a military entity. For example, if a particular 
weapon does not work in a combat airplane or in a ship, the airplane or the 
ship will be subject to destruction by the enemy. The development of 
mission-critical systems poses similar challenges as in the case of real-
time systems.  
• Embedded Systems: Embedded systems are systems that are parts of a 
larger hardware/software system. These systems often require special 
purpose hardware entailing increased optimization. The software 
associated with these systems has to work with this hardware and requires 
more attention. Signal processing components (that may be hardware, 
software or firmware-based) found in weapon systems are examples of 
such systems. 
• Interaction with External Environment: Real-time systems typically 
interact with an external environment that generally does not involve 
humans [16]. In this environment, the interactions are generally not 
periodic; therefore timing constraints can be more complex. For example, 
a combat system may include a close-in weapons system to protect the 
ship from incoming missiles. This requires monitoring the signals in the 
environment and initiating the necessary components of various weapon 
systems components.   
• Reactive Systems: Reactive systems are the systems that respond to 
external stimuli in a limited time period. Many real-time systems are 
reactive systems [17]. This is also the case for weapon systems. These 
types of systems are event-driven and must respond to external stimuli 
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[16]. In most cases, the system has to keep a history of previous events to 
determine the corresponding response. For example, in a torpedo system, 
the number of captured signals from a target within a specific time period 
may initiate a number of actions. The correct implementation of reactive 
systems poses different challenges than many other systems due to the 
unpredictable nature of their environments.  
• High Quality Systems: Weapon systems must be high quality systems. 
Current state of the art does not have a precise quality metric for software 
systems. However, quality includes attributes such as reliability, 
performance, fault-tolerance, safety, security, availability, testability, and 
maintainability [18]. Some of these attributes have metrics, but the 
software engineering discipline is far from having a quality metric. The 
quality in weapons system software is understood by user satisfaction, 
which is mostly after the fact. Generally, weapon systems must be reliable, 
available, safe, maintainable, and fault-tolerant. In short, they have to 
include almost all quality attributes. Software Productivity Research 
Incorporation has been measuring software quality and productivity since 
1985. Their findings indicate that defense systems projects rank at the top 
in software quality [19]. However, defense systems also rank last in terms 
of software productivity. Developing high quality software is a labor 
intensive task and requires software development best practices.  
b.  Managerial Characteristics of Weapon Systems Software 
Development 
Weapon systems software acquisition and development is different than 
commercial systems acquisition. The main reason behind this difference is that having 
the government as a customer enforces serious overhead in the process. Capers Jones 
reports in his article [19] that defense software projects rank last in terms of software 
productivity. The main reason is that Department of Defense standards created a number 
of extra tasks for defense software that do not occur in the civilian sector, which is also 
the same for other countries.  
The report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Software 
[13] is merely focused on the difficulties of military software development. The report 
identifies the following in its executive summary section.  
In spite of the substantial technical development needed in requirements-
setting, metrics, and measures, tools, etc., the Task Force is convinced that 
today’s major problems with military software development are not 
technical problems, but management problems. 
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This finding is also supported by a more recent report (November 2000) by the Defense 
Science Board.  
The major challenge of defense systems including weapon systems is due 
to acquisition policies. In acquisition, the government releases a general requirements 
documentation. Potential contractors develop specifications based on this documentation. 
Then, the government grants the projects on a better value bidding policy. After the 
project is granted, the requirements become inflexible and almost freeze in many cases. 
This is contradictory to the nature of software development. Even if the contractor wants 
to change some of the initial requirements, the process is so cumbersome that the change 
becomes risky in the development cycle.  
Another main challenge imposed by the government is that defense 
software requires must be compatible with many standards and regulations. Another 
consequence of this requirement is the extensive documentation to show such 
compatibilities.  
The details of managerial characteristics of weapon systems development 
is already addressed in other studies and these studies are listed in the previous studies in 
military section of the thesis.  
3. Previous Studies on Military Software 
Previous studies on military software are limited. The major reports and 
publications on the issue are produced by the Defense Science Board [12] established in 
1956 under the Assistant Secretary of Defense. This board was created to prepare reports 
related to military software from time to time. Some of the reports are as follows: 
• Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Software – 
1987  
• Defense Science Board Task Force on Acquiring Defense Software 
Commercially – 1994  
• Report of the Defense Science Board Tasks on Open Systems – 1998 
• Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force On Defense Software – 
2000 
There are also other reports prepared by the science panels of the military services 
and the National Research Council: 
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• Adapting Software Development Policies to Modern Technology-1989 
[14] 
• The Report of the AMC Software Task Force -1989  
• Scaling Up: A Research Agenda For Software Engineering – Computer 
Science and Technology Board Research Council- 1989 
Crosstalk – The Journal of Defense Software Engineering is also another source 
of information. This journal is an approved Department of Defense journal. In every 
issue, the journal addresses specific issues related to defense software. [15] However, 
there is no specific issue addressing this topic.  
Also, none of these studies or articles includes a clear-cut analysis of weapon 
systems software. The necessity of such differentiation is still up for debate. However, 
this thesis will not address this issue. 
4. Technical Challenges of Weapons Systems Software Development 
Addressing all the challenges of weapons systems development is not the purpose 
of this study. However, it is an issue that many researchers have been studying for years. 
Thus, in this part of this thesis, only a few of the issues, especially those different from 
commercial software development, will be addressed.  
The report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software [11] 
generally focuses on the managerial aspects of the development. However, the report also 
briefly mentions the technical challenges. 
The United States is the major producer and consumer of defense software in the 
world and by away the leader [19]. Most of the researches on related issues are also 
conducted in this country. The findings of this research are also applicable to other 
countries.  
Most of the issues identified in this study are the projections of managerial 
aspects of weapons systems development. There are also inherent challenges due to the 
type of software produced. These inherent challenges are also seen in commercial 
software development. 
Some of the technical challenges of weapons systems development are as follows: 
• The applicability of the waterfall model to software projects is limited. 
This model only works well for custom-developed software where 
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requirements are fixed when the design begins. Most of the software 
projects still employ a waterfall model [11]. This, in fact, is a side effect of 
the current software acquisition policies. 
• One of the enforcements of the waterfall model is the extensive 
documentation required after each phase. This, in fact, works well with the 
acquisition policy. Documentation is also very important for maintenance. 
However, the documentation itself requires maintenance just as does the 
software. Whenever a change occurs in the software, the documentation 
also needs to be modified as necessary. If the documentation is more than 
adequate, then modification is an extra cost. How much documentation is 
enough and necessary is openly debated for weapons systems software 
development.  
• Having the government as a customer forces the contractors to comply 
with many standards, regulations, and policies. This, in fact, helps the 
customers to develop high quality systems. However, compliance issues 
drive up the cost and reduce productivity. The volume of defense software 
specifications and other paper documents has been three times larger when 
compared to the civilian sector [19]. Also, the software engineering 
discipline is a fast-emerging discipline. The standards must keep pace with 
current practices, and this issue is burdensome for government agencies.  
• The programming language Ada was enforced by the DoD in many 
projects for nearly two decades. Using Ada as the programming language 
in military software was a recommendation in the 1987 report[13]. Since 
then, the use of Ada became a choice in many weapons systems software 
development. The benefits of using Ada are also recognized by the 
commercial sector, especially in aviation systems. On the other hand, new 
programming languages have been introduced. One of them is Java, which 
offers a platform independent development environment. This property 
made the Java programming language a widely-used and productive 
environment. However, Ada has always found limited usage, which 
restricts the number of language experts. The choice of Ada in weapons 
systems software development has come into question due to the newest 
technologies introduced everyday. 
• Lacking a quality metric for software poses another challenge for weapons 
systems software development in which the quality of the product is 
unquestionable crucial. According to a study conduced by the Standish 
Group [20], only 16% of all IT projects are completed on time and on 
budget. The study includes a variety of projects from commercial and 
defense software. Having a quality metric will play a key role in 
increasing this percentage. Although, the software engineering discipline 
is far from creating such a metric. 
• Most of the weapons systems software development requires longer 
schedules when compared to similar developments in the commercial 
world. Just reaching a final decision on military software contracts results 
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in a delay of between six to 18 months [19] and this is even before the 
work starts. When the schedule is long, the requirements are more likely to 
change. In a weapons systems context, software will work with specialized 
hardware and the hardware technology advances very rapidly. Therefore, 
even the change in hardware technology will necessitate requirements 
changes in software.  
• The requirements extraction in the weapons systems software process is 
particularly harder than many other commercial applications. The main 
reason behind this challenge is that there are many shareholders in 
weapons systems software. The list starts with the government, the 
service, the standards, and the users. Even some of the weapons systems 
are developed with the participation of many countries. The F-16 combat 
airplane and Harpoon missile are examples of such weapons. This is 
hardly the case for many commercial systems. 
• Defense software is often more complex than commercial software. This 
is a consequence of requirements to provide greater functionality and 
higher reliability than commercial systems [11]. Figure II-.5 shows code 
size over complexity for various systems. The development of complex 
systems is an obvious challenge. Mostly military software must integrate 
with many other systems and legacy systems.  
 
Figure II-5. Code Size/Complexity Growth [From 11] 
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• Information security is an important issue for governments. Weapons 
systems software development is also affected by this issue. The 
development of these weapons must occur in a secure environment. Also, 
the product must be resistible to malicious attacks. In other words, the 
weapons systems software must be secure. The development of secure 


























As mentioned in the introduction, TLCharts [1], proposed by Drusinsky, is a 
hybrid of Harel Statecharts [2], and temporal logic. It combines the power of the two 
specification languages. This chapter will provide a brief introduction to Harel 
Statecharts, temporal logic, and TLCharts. 
A. HAREL STATECHARTS 
1. Introduction 
Statecharts is a widely accepted specification language. The main reason for its 
acceptance is that statecharts are capable of representing the behavioral aspects of 
reactive systems in a visual form. A reactive system, unlike a transformational system, is 
generally event-driven. It continuously reacts to external and internal stimuli. The 
behavior of a reactive system can be characterized as the set of allowed sequences of 
input and output events, conditions, and actions.  
Finite state machines and their corresponding state diagrams have been used to 
formally describe sequential logic circuits for a long time. State diagrams are directed 
graphs, showing the states with nodes and the transitions with arrows. The arrows are 
labeled with the triggering events and guarding condition. However, state diagrams are 
incapable of describing complex systems due to the exponentially growing number of 
states and transitions. They are also flat, which eliminates the capability of a top-down 
formalism. In order to successfully represent complex reactive systems, a state/event 
approach must be modular, hierarchical and well-structured [2]. Statecharts were 
proposed as a solution to overcome such challenges.  
Since statecharts were first defined by Harel [2], many variants of the language 
were proposed in the literature. A survey in 1994 discusses nearly 20 variants [21]. 
Statecharts is an unofficial language. Therefore, no complete specification of the 
language exists. Today, two of the variants are used extensively. The first is Harel 
Statecharts and the second is UML Statecharts [22]. These two variants and many other 
variants are supported by the tools. Thus, the semantics of the language is dependent on 
the tools that the developers use.  
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This thesis will briefly introduce Harel statecharts as proposed in [2]. The detailed 
description of the language can be found in [2, 17, 23]. All the variants including UML 
Statecharts are extended and modified versions of Harel Statecharts.  
Harel, briefly explains the main aspects of the language in [2] as 
Statecharts constitute a visual formalism for describing states and 
transitions in a modular fashion, enabling clustering, orthogonality (i.e., 
concurrency) and refinement, and encouraging ‘zoom’ capabilities for 
moving easily back and forth  between levels of abstraction. 
statecharts = state-diagrams + depth + orthogonality + broadcast-
communication. 
2. State-levels: Clustering and Refinement 
The most important drawback of the use of state diagrams in a complex systems 
representation is that state diagrams are flat. Therefore, statecharts overcome this 
problem by means of clustering and refinements.  
Figure III-1 shows a simple state diagram of a specification. 
 
Figure III-1. Simple State Diagram 
 
In the state diagram, the states are represented with rounded rectangles. The 
names of the states are shown on the upper right corner of the states. Transitions between 
states are represented with arrows. The labels on the arrows are the events that cause state 
transitions. In the state diagram, event x takes the system to state D from states A, B, or 
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C. Therefore, these states can be clustered to one superstate as shown in Figure III-2. The 
new superstate is called state E.  
 
Figure III-2. Introduction of Superstate E 
 
If Figures III-1 and III-2 are compared, note that the number of transitions is 
reduced by two in this simple state diagram. The semantics of E is the exclusive-or 
(XOR) of state A, B, and C. When the system is in superstate E, actually the system can 
only be in state A, B, or C. Therefore, this superstate is an abstraction of the states.  
The system can also be analyzed by a top-down approach. Consider Figure III-3.  
 
Figure III-3. Top-Down Approach of the System 
 
Figure III-3 shows the same system without the details of state E. Using a top-
down approach, state E will be refined and the system state diagram will become the 
diagram shown in Figure III-2.  
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The example shows the use of clustering and refinement. Clustering or abstraction 
is a bottom-up concept. Refinement is a top-down approach. These two mechanisms 
enable the representation of complex systems in a feasible way.  
Sometimes, the system may require remembering the last state visited in a group 
of states when entering that group. This is called “entering-by-history” [2]. The history 
within a superstate is denoted by the letter H surrounded by a circle. The history can be 
applied to the lowest level in the hierarchy by attaching an asterisk to the H.  
The initial state of a statechart is represented by an arc originating from a small 
black circle. The final state is denoted by a larger black circle inside a bigger white circle. 
The use of entering-by-history, initial state, and final state is shown in Figure III-
4. 
 
Figure III-4. Uses of Entering-By-History, Initial State, and Final State 
 
3. Orthogonality: Independence and Concurrency 
The orthogonality of statecharts explains AND decomposition of states. When the 
system must be in all of its AND components, the orthogonality property of statecharts is 
used. Consider a simple example. The motor of a car is either running or stopping and the 
radio of the car may be on or off. Assume the system is the car. The state of the car is 
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denoted by state A. State B represents the motor state, and the state C represents the radio 
state. Figure III-5 shows the statechart of the car system. 
 
Figure III-5. Statechart of the Car System 
 
When the car is in the default state, it is stopping and its radio is off. The event x 
denotes the event of turning the car key. After the driver turns the key, the car starts 
running. The event y represents the event of pushing the radio on button. While the car is 
running, the driver turns on the radio by event y. Then, the driver wants to stop the car 
and he turns the key. This event causes two transitions in the diagram. The first one 
causes the car to stop and the second causes the radio to be off (if it is on).   
Figure III-5 illustrates state A consisting of AND components B and C. Therefore, 
state A is the orthogonal product of states B and C. Event x is the synchronization event 
which takes the system to the stopping and radio_off states at the same time. The 
independence property of statecharts is shown by event y; since this event only takes the 
system from the radio_off state to the radio_on state. Both behaviors are part of 
orthogonality of states B and C, which is used to describe the AND decomposition [2]. 
The lack of orthogonality in finite state machines causes the formalism to suffer from an 
exponentially increasing number of states. 
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4. Conditions, Actions and Activities 
In statecharts, transitions can be labeled in the form e(C)/A, where e is the event 
triggering the transition, C is the condition, and A is the action associated with the 
transition. Conditions are also known as guards. In this form, a transition only occurs if 
the event is triggered and the condition is true. Actions are carried out by the system and 
they take zero time ideally. Events and actions are closely related; actions may be events 
for other transitions.   
 
Figure III-6. Examples of Actions and Conditions 
 
In Figure III-6, the system is in a default state (E,G,I). When event y occurs, the 
condition in the I to J transition becomes true, and the system is in state (E,G,J). If event 
w does not occur and event x occurs, action e will be carried out, which is an event within 
superstate B. Therefore, the transition between E and F will take place, generating the 
action a. This action is an event within the superstate D and will cause the system 
transition to state (F,H,K).  
An action can also be attached to a state while entering or exiting from that state. 
The keywords entry and exit are used for this purpose.  
Activities are like actions. However, unlike actions, activities are not 
instantaneous. They are durable. An activity may be carried out continuously throughout 
the system’s being in the state [2]. Figure III-7 illustrates the concepts. 
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Figure III-7. Examples of Activities 
 
In Figure III-7, T and Y are activities. They carried out by the system when the 
system is in state (E,J). Action U, which is attached to state F, is accomplished when the 
system is entering state (D,F). When event x occurs, the system actually carries out two 
actions. The first is due to exiting from state D and the second is because of entering state 
E. Action S, which is an event between state J and F, is attached to state E on exit.  
5. Condition and Selection Entrances 
Two other types of circled connectives, other than H (History), are used for 
abbreviating more complicated entrances to substates of a superstate [2]. The first one is 
conditional, denoted by C, and the second one is selection, denoted by S.  
Figure III-8 (a) shows a statechart specification without the use of a conditional. 
Figure III-8 (b) illustrates the specification when the conditional is used. Notice the 
simplified version in Figure III-8 (c) when the superstate is abstracted.  
Selection occurs when a simple event transition to different states based on the 
value of this simple event. Figure III-9 presents the use of selection in statecharts taken 
from [2]. 
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                       (a)                                                                  (b) 
 
               (c) 
Figure III-8. Example of a Conditional 
 
 




6. Delays and Timeouts 
In Harel statecharts, time restrictions can be applied to states to some extent. The 
notation used for time restriction is timeout(event,number). This notation represents the 
event that occurs precisely when the specified number of time units have elapsed from 
the occurrence of the specified event [2]. A state can also be associated with a lower 
bound time restriction. The syntax of the specification is ∆t1 < ∆t2, which shows the upper 
and lower bound at the same time. Figure III-10 illustrates such concepts. 
 
Figure III-10. Examples of a Delay and a Timeout 
 
In Figure III-10, the system has to stay in state A for at least two seconds. State A 
also has a timeout, which is 15 seconds.  
7. Drawbacks of Harel Statecharts 
Statechart is one of the most successful visual specification language attempts. 
However, the language still suffers from some drawbacks: 
• Semantics: Statechart is not an official language. Mostly, the semantics are 
enforced by the tools. The enforced semantics vary among tool vendors. 
• Notion of Time: In statecharts, transitions and actions occur 
instantaneously, which is not realistic for the specification of reactive and 
real-time systems. 
• Race Conditions: If the system is not designed and specified with caution, 
race conditions may occur. The language is incapable of eliminating such 
conditions. Consider the example in Figure III-11. Event x causes the 
system transition to state (F,H). These transitions are attached with two 
actions modifying the value of variable a. However, the assignment is 
contradictory and the specification is unclear about the final value of a.  
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Figure III-11. Example of a Race Condition 
 
B. TEMPORAL LOGIC 
Reactive systems are quite different from transformational systems. They are 
typically, non-terminating, continuously reading input, continuously producing output, 
and regularly interacting with the environment [24]. Most reactive systems are also real-
time systems. For real-time systems, satisfying temporal constraints are crucial. 
Therefore, the notion of time is important for these systems. Temporal logic has been 
proposed to specification and verification of program and system behavior, especially for 
these types of systems. The first significant proposal was made by Pnueli [25, 26].  
As discussed earlier, most weapons systems are safety-critical real-time reactive 
systems and this portion of the thesis will provide a brief introduction to temporal logics. 
The specification of a system in temporal logics is generally divided into two 
aspects: Safety conditions and liveness conditions. Such conditions are described as 
follows: 
• Safety Conditions: These conditions are the type of conditions which the 
system shall not do. For example, a missile system shall not fire until the 
operator pushes the unlock safety button.  
• Liveness Conditions: These conditions are those which the system should 
do. For example, the missile shall fire within three seconds after the fire 
button is pressed.  
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These conditions help the weapon systems to be better specified. Thus, modeling 
systems with temporal logics and investigating the correctness of system specification is 
an essential part of weapon system software development.  
1. Classical Logic 
The order of a logic theory defines the domain of all formulas described by the 
logic: Propositional order, first order and higher order.  
Propositional logic consists of a set of elementary facts and logic operators. 
Formulas are built using these facts and operators. Logic operators in classical logic are: 
¬:  Not 
∧ : And 
∨ : Or 
⇒: Conditional 
⇔: Biconditional 
Formulas can be defined in terms of truth tables or by induction on the structure 
of itself. Formulas take a logical value true ( T ), or  false ( ⊥ ).  
First order logic extends the propositional logic with the introduction of a domain, 
n-ary relationships on the domain, n-ary predicates associated with the relationships, the 
universal quantifier ∀ (for all), and the existential quantifier ∃ (exists). In first order 
logic, quantified variables must be the elements of the domain and not full predicates. 
Therefore, quantifiers cannot be varied over predicates. Higher order logic relaxes this 
constraint and extends the domain modeled by first order logic by allowing adaptation of 
predicates as quantification variables. [27]   
2. Modal Logic 
Propositions in classical logic are static. Their value is fixed and time-
independent. Therefore, classical logic can only express atemporal (non-time-dependent) 
formulas. Consider the proposition, “Bob is thirsty”. In classical logic, the proposition 
will be evaluated true or false for all times. Nonetheless, in real life, the evaluation of this 
proposition changes over time. Bob might have been thirsty yesterday after jogging. Bob 
38 
just drank a soda and might not be thirsty for the next three hours. The example shows 
that the truth value of the proposition depends on time.   
In classical logic, there is only one world. However, in modal logic, there are 
worlds and the concepts of truth and falsity are not static and immutable. The formulas 
may be evaluated differently in different worlds.  
A modal logic system is defined by <W,R,V> where: W is the set of worlds, R ⊆ 
W × W is the reachability relationships between worlds; and V is the evaluation of 
function for formulas: 
V : F × W → { T , ⊥ }, 
where F is the set of formulas of the modal theory. [27] The modal logic introduces two 
other operators in addition to classical logic operators: L (necessary) and M (possibly). 
The evaluation function V is defined over the modal operators L and M, as follows [27]:   
V(Mƒ,w) = T  iff  ∃v  ∈ W.wRv ⇒ V(ƒ,v); 
V(Lƒ,w) = T  iff  ∀v  ∈ W.wRv ⇒ V(ƒ,v). 
M and L can be thought as the existential and universal quantifier defined over the 
set of reachable worlds from the current world.  
Using the modal logic, it is possible to define a relation R, next instant over the 
worlds. This relation makes it possible to define worlds, which are the set of system 
configurations. The evaluations of a formula within the system model can change in 
successive time instants. Therefore, modal logic can be used to define temporal behavior.  
3. Temporal Logic 
Temporal logic is a branch of modal logic. Temporal logic especially deals with 
the notion of time and order. The definition of temporal logic by NIST [28] is as follows: 
A logic with a notion of time included. The formulas can express facts 
about past, present, and future states. 
Temporal logics extend the classical logic by adding a set of new operators. In 
temporal logics, the value of a formula is dynamic. Therefore, the evaluation the formula 
depends on the interpretation and the time. [27]  
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Generally, temporal logics add four new operators to the classical logic [29].  
G, always in the future, 
F, eventually in the future, 
H, always in the past, 
P, eventually in the past. 
The operators G,F,H, and P can be formally defined as[27]: 
V(Gƒ,t) = T  iff  ∀s  ∈ T.t<s ⇒ V(ƒ,s); 
V(Hƒ,t) = T  iff  ∀s  ∈ T.s<t ⇒ V(ƒ,s); 
Fƒ ≡ ¬G ¬ƒ; 
Pƒ ≡ ¬H ¬ƒ. 
These operators can express the notion of necessity and possibility; therefore 
temporal logics are a part of modal logic. There are also other operators that can be added 
to logics. If the relation < is transitive and nonreflexive, the operators until and since can 
be introduced as follows [27]: 
until, with p until q that is true if q will be true in the future and until that instant 
p will always be true;  
since, with p since q that is true if q was true in the past and since that instant p 
has always been true; 
The binary operators until and since can be formally defined as: 
V(ƒ1 until ƒ2, t) = T iff ∃s ∈ T.t<s ∧ V(ƒ2,s) ∧ ∀u ∈ T.t<u<s ⇒ V(ƒ1,u);    
V(ƒ1 since ƒ2, t) = T iff ∃s ∈ T.s<t ∧ V(ƒ2,s) ∧ ∀u ∈ T.s<u<t ⇒ V(ƒ1,u).    
These operators add more expressiveness to the logics and the previous operators 
G,F,H, and P can be expressed with the operators until and since: 
Fp ≡ T until p; 
Pp ≡ T since p; 
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Gp ≡ ¬F ¬p; 
Hp ≡ ¬P ¬p. 
Having distinctive operators for the past and the future eases the specification of 
the system. In fact, the formulas in temporal logics can easily be shifted to the past or to 
the future [27].  
These operators have other notations as follows: 
G ≡ □, 
F ≡ ◊, 
H ≡ ■, 
P ≡ ♦, 
until  ≡ U , 
since ≡ I, 
next  ≡ ο, 
prev  ≡ •. 
4. Examples of Temporal Logics 
There are many variations on temporal logic: Propositional Temporal Logic 
(PTL), Choppy Logic, Branching Time Temporal Logic (BTTL), Interval Temporal 
Logic (ITL), Propositional Modal Logic of Time Intervals (PMLTI), Computational Tree 
Logic (CTL), Interval Logic (IL), Extended Interval Logic (EIL), Real-Time Interval 
Logic (RTIL), Logic of Time Intervals (LTI), Real-Time Temporal Logic (RTTL), Timed 
Propositional Temporal Logic (TPTL), Real-Time Logic (RTL), Tempo Reale ImplicitO 
(TRIO), Metric Temporal Logic (MTL), and Time Interval Logic with Compositional 
Operators (TILCO). All these temporal logics can be divided into two categories. The 
first category consists of the temporal logics without a metric for time. They are PTL, 
Choppy Logic, BTTL, ITL, PMLTI, IL, CTL, and LTL. The second category are those 
with a metric for time. EIL, RTIL, RTTL, TPTL, RTL, TRIO, MTL, and TILCO belong 
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to the second category. The expressiveness of the logics in the first category is not always 
sufficient for real time system specification, because quantitative temporal constraints 
cannot be expressed [27]. Other than this categorization, not all of the variants are well-
recognized. The most widely-known temporal logics are PTL, BTTL, CTL, and MTL.  
Propositional temporal logic (PTL) [25, 26, 30] extends the propositional logic by 
adding the following temporal operators: always in the future (□), eventually in the 
future (◊), next (ο), and until (U). PTL approaches the system specification from the 
point of states. The propositions extended with temporal operators specify the system 
temporal evolution. PTL is a linear event-based logic without providing a metric for time. 
[27] 
Branching time temporal logic (BTTL) [33] is an extension of PTL, which 
introduces branching in the future. This feature enables BTTL to describe the 
nondeterministic behavior of systems. Models based on BTTL formulas can be used to 
build operationally executable state machines. [27] However, the inability to specify 
quantitative temporal constraints makes the logic unsuitable for real-time system 
specification.  
Computational tree logic (CTL) [31] is a propositional branching time temporal 
logic unlike many others. The approach of CTL for specifying systems is the notion of 
several futures, called sequences.  The fundamental temporal entity is the point and CTL 
also does not provide a metric for time.  
Metric temporal logic (MTL) [32] extends first order logic with temporal 
operators: G,F,H,and P [27]. The most important aspect of MTL is providing a metric for 
time. Table III-1 provides a comparison of temporal logics. 
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Table III-1. Comparing Features of Temporal Logics [From 27] 
 
C. TLCHARTS 
TLCharts, proposed by Drusinsky [1], is a visual specification language that 
combines non-deterministic Harel Statecharts, and formal specifications written in 
Linear-time (metric) temporal logic.  TLCharts combines the expressive power of two 
formalisms and overcomes some of problems of each formalism. Non-deterministic Harel 
Statecharts are visual and intuitive. Formal specification written in Linear-time (metric) 
temporal logic has the expressive power to represent complex temporal behavior required 
by real-time systems. LTL and MTL are textual and the resulting specifications are hard 
to read and maintain.  TLCharts is a true automata-theoretic hybrid of two formalisms 
with a unified syntax and semantics. Therefore, the hybrid specification language is 
highly visual and familiar, with special LTL annotation of some transition [1].  
Non-deterministic Finite Automate (NFA) can be used as a specification language 
[34]. The TLChart formalism extends the NFA formalism in two ways [1]: 
• NFA formalisms are flat and sequential; however, TLCharts suggests 
using non-deterministic statecharts. 
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• TLCharts supports the use of LTL, MTL and TLS [35] assertions along 
transitions. 
TLCharts extend Harel statecharts by [1]: 
• Enabling the LTL, MTL or TLS conditioned transitions, 
• Supporting non-deterministic behavior, 
• Being able to represent good and bad computations with ambiguities 
resolved based on priorities, and 
• Enabling overlapping states.  
The relations between TLCharts and its constituents are given in Figure III-12. 
Armor-plating a specification is the activity of over-specification with the purpose 
of providing additional assurance that a specific requirement is satisfied. TLCharts offer 
such an opportunity to fully specified TLCharts or statecharts by adding temporal 
conditions. An example of armor-plating a system specification using TLCharts is found 
in [36]. 
The motivation behind the TLCharts specification language is the concern for 
effective, early phase specifications before system design and implementations. In most 
cases, formal specifications of other types are used to analyze the correctness properties 
of an existing system. The detailed syntax and semantics of TLCharts can be found in [1].  
 
Figure III-12. Relations between TLCharts and its Constituents (Syntax) 
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1. An Infusion Pump Keypad Control Example 
The infusion pump keypad control example is taken from [37]. The example 
consists of four conditions: infusionBegin, infusionEnd, keyPressed, and alarm. The 
associated requirement is as follows: 
R1: Between every infusionBegin and an End-condition session, a 
keyPressed must be repeatedly sensed within 2-minute intervals. 
Otherwise, an alarm must sound within 10 seconds and until keyPressed 
is sensed. Once the alarm sounds according to this specification than the 
assertion has succeeded and no more alarms are permitted. The End-
condition is defined infusionEnd being sensed until infusionBegin is 
sensed. 
The following MTL assertion is an attempt to capture the previous requirement 
R1:  
L1:   ( infusionBegin =>  
L2:     ( (( infusionBegin ∨ keyPressed ) => 
L3:         ( (   ¬alarm) ∧ 
L4:            ((Ο ◊≤120 keyPressed) 
L5:               ∨ (¬keyPressed U [120,130]  
L6:                   (alarm U  
L7:                           (keyPressed∧  ¬alarm))) 
L8:            ) 
L9:         ) 
L10:     ) U (infusionEnd U 
L11:                   (infusionBegin  ∧ infusionEnd)) 
L12:    )) 
In the above MTL assertion, line L1 starts the session. Lines L2 and L4 together 
require a recurring keyPressed event that is to be sensed every two minutes. Line L3 
ensures that the alarm is not continuous during those two minutes. Lines L5, L6 and L7 
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ensure an alarm within 10 seconds at the end of the two minutes period and until 
keyPressed is sensed. There will be no alarm afterwards. Line L10 and L11 are for the 
End-condition defined as infusionEnd being sensed until infusionBegin is sensed.  
As discussed in [37], the MTL assertion suffers from several deficiencies. First of 
all, even though the natural language requirement is easier to understand, the previous 
attempt to formalize the requirement using MTL is arguably non-trivial. Some terms used 
in the MTL assertion are confusing, such as “infusionEnd U (infusionBegin ∧ 
infusionEnd)”. Also, the MTL specification does not forbid an alarm while not in 
session. Such constraint is included in Figures III-13 and III-14. Figure III-13 is a Harel 
statechart specification of the assertion while Figure III-14 is the corresponding TLChart 
specification.  
The MTL specification might fail under certain scenarios, which are discussed in 
detail in [37]. In short, it can be argued that temporal logic requirements are hard to read, 
write and maintain. TLChart specification attempts to overcome such difficulties by 



























Figure III-13. Deterministic Harel Statechart Specification for Requirement R1 [From 
37] 
 
In the Harel statechart specification, the transition from state Init to Error ensures 
that there should be no alarm during sessions.  Such Error state is also included in the 
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Figure III-14. TLChart Specification for Requirement R1 [From 37] 
 
Both Figures III-13 and III-14 are in fact legal TLCharts. Since Harel statecharts 
are a special case of TLCharts, so are LTL and MTL. The specifications in both figures 
solve the problems previously mentioned. The TLChart differs in two main ways from a 
deterministic statechart [37]: 
1.  Some transitions include LTL, MTL and TLS conditions. For example, the 
transition labeled “alarmU keyPressed”. 
2.   TLChart specification is non-deterministic, which may exist in two ways:  
a.  Two or more propositional conditions may become true 
simultaneously. For example in Figure III-14, alarm and 
keyPressed may become true at the same time, creating ambiguity. 
While this form of non-determinism is undesirable, it is easily 
avoidable using logic prioritization or by using events, guaranteed 
to be mutually exclusive. 
b.  Two or more transitions with temporal conditions may be traversed 
at the same time.  
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Harel statecharts must be deterministic when used for a specification. Otherwise, 
the specification is ambiguous. Achieving a correct deterministic behavior is the most 
critical part of the implementation process.  
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IV. A CASE STUDY: KTORP 
A. KTORP INTRODUCTION 
KTorp is an artificially created submarine-launched homing torpedo. Although it 
is an artificial torpedo, the specification of KTorp captures some important dynamic 
characteristics of real homing torpedoes. Since this is an unclassified study, a real torpedo 
example cannot be used. Therefore, detailed classified specifications of similar real 
torpedo systems are not mentioned in this study. The rest of the specifications are 
deviated on purpose from real examples so as not to reveal classified information. In this 
sense, KTorp is abstracted and simplified from real torpedo examples. Even with its 
current simplified specification, KTorp adequately serves as a weapon system example 
for the purpose of this study.  
KTorp is a submarine-launched homing torpedo for underwater targets. Many 
torpedoes have an umbilical cord attached to its mother ship. This cord (in other words 
wire) enables the torpedo to be guided by the submarine personnel after the torpedo 
launched. However, the cord limits the maneuverability of the submarine. To simplify the 
case study, KTorp is specified without an umbilical cord. In this sense, KTorp is a 
“launch-and-forget” type of homing torpedo. KTorp can operate in any sea condition and 
has five main sections: 
• Homing Head Section:  This section is found in the head of KTorp. It 
contains a sonar device, transceivers and the necessary wiring. 
• Warhead Section:  The warhead with an exploder is the main parts of this 
section. The ignition of explosives in the warhead is triggered by a 
proximity switch. Therefore, KTorp must hit its target in order to explode 
and destroy. 
• Battery Section: KTorp is a battery-powered torpedo just like most real 
torpedoes. The battery section provides power for the navigation and the 
electronics. KTorp will try to search and destroy its target until the battery 
depletes. 
• Control Section: All the necessary electronic control logic is found in this 
section. The torpedo has a central embedded computer and various 
embedded controllers to guide itself to the target and control all the 
support functions.  
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• Motor Section: This section contains the engine and the propellers. The 
engine is also controlled by the central embedded computer found in the 
control section. The engine is powered by the battery. The propellers are 
located at the back of the torpedo. 
Figure IV-1 shows an illustration of KTorp sections.  
 
 
Figure IV-1. Illustration of KTorp Sections 
 
B. KTORP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
Ktorp technical specifications are as follows: 
TS.1. The torpedo has two different speeds: 
• High Speed: 42 Knots 
• Low Speed: 30 Knots 
TS.2. The navigation depth of KTorp is between 35 ft. and 2,000 ft. 
TS.3. The approximate torpedo run time, which depends on the state of the 
battery, is about 30 minutes at low speed and 15 minutes at high speed. 
TS.4. KTorp has two different search modes: 
• Snake Search Mode 
• Circular Search Mode 
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The details of these modes will be given in the dynamic specification of KTorp. 
TS.5. KTorp can be set to enable at a particular distance from the mother ship. 
This distance is called “Enable Distance”. The enable distance can be configured between 
500 yards and 3,000 yards before launch.  
C. SAFETY-RELATED SPECIFICATIONS 
Most weapon systems are safety critical systems. Ktorp is one such system., 
Therefore, this section specifies the requirements that are safety related. 
SR.1. If KTorp is unable to find its target, it should not explode in any case. At 
the end of run, the power to the warhead is cut and the torpedo will be disarmed. 
SR.2. KTorp should not explode in any case before it reaches the enable distance. 
SR.3. KTorp should not navigate above 35 feet in any case. 
SR.4. If KTorp reaches a depth below 2,000 feet, it should not explode in any 
case. Therefore, the torpedo must be disarmed after reaching this depth. (The sea pressure 
below 2,000 feet may damage the torpedo hull and decrease the probability of it 
functioning correctly.) 
SR.5. KTorp is disarmed after 35 minutes of run time in any case.   
D.  DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR OF KTORP 
Like every other weapon system, the goal of KTorp is destroying the target. In 
order to reach this goal, KTorp searches, attacks and destroys its target. These behaviors 
are differentiated using torpedo run phases. The dynamic behavior of KTorp consists of 
three basic phases. 
1.  Enable Phase 
The goal of this phase is to ensure the safety of the mother ship. In the enable 
phase, KTorp is disarmed and its sonar is inactive. Thus, the torpedo is unable to detect 
signals and attack its mother ship by any means. During this phase, the torpedo will 
follow a straight path until it reaches the enable distance. The enable phase ends with an 
internal signal generated by a unit called “Inertial Measurement Unit” (IMU). This unit is 




2.  Search Phase 
The goal in this phase is to detect a potential target. After the enable phase, the 
torpedo enters the search phase. The sonar and transceivers become active and the 
torpedo begins to search for its target. This search has a predefined specification 
determined by KTorp search mode. 
3.  Attack Phase 
The goal in this phase is to focus on a potential target. KTorp narrows its search 
space and increases the sensitivity of signal reception. This phase is the final phase before 
the final attack. If KTorp is unable to find the target within one minute, then it will turn 
back to the search phase. 
E.  SEARCH MODES 
As mentioned in the technical specifications, there are two different search 
modes. The reason for two different search modes lies in the solution of a fire control 
problem. When a submarine detects a potential target, the fire control party (the 
submarine personnel responsible for the weapon systems) enters the estimated parameters 
of the target into the fire control system. Estimated parameters define the movement of 
the potential target. Then, the fire control system analyzes the parameters and sets up a 
fire control problem. The sensors monitor the potential target and feed the fire control 
system with the updated parameters. After the fire control system reaches a solution for 
the fire control problem, the submarine commander decides on the search mode of the 
torpedo. Then, the torpedo is a launched.  
The first type of search mode is called “Snake Search” because of the similarity 
between a snake’s movement and the navigation pattern of KTorp in this search mode. 
This type of search mode is used when the depth of the target is known but the distance is 
unknown.  
The second type of search mode is called “Circular Search”. Again, the name of 
the mode reveals the navigation pattern of KTorp. In this mode, the first 1,000 yards of 
the navigation resembles the snake search except for the specification of the signal 
reception. After this navigation, KTorp begins to dive and search for its target by circling 
with a diameter of 1,000 yards. When the torpedo reaches the depth limit (2,000 ft), it 
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begins to rise with the same pattern. The circular search mode is used when the distance 
of the potential target is known but the depth is not known.  
The exact patterns of search modes are given below in steps. 
1. Snake Search 
SS.1. KTorp will dive or rise to its search depth with a straight navigation path. 
KTorp is in enable phase until it reaches enable distance. 
SS.2. When KTorp reaches the enable distance, it will arm itself and its sonar 
will become active. At this point, KTorp enters the search phase. 
SS.3. In the search phase, KTorp’s navigation is just like a snake. First, KTorp 
will steer 15° right angle (“starboard” in Navy lingo) and navigates 300 yards. Then, 
KTorp will steer 30° left angle (“port” in Navy lingo) and 30° right angle after navigating 
300 yards in each turn. This pattern continues until KTorp enters the attack phase.  
SS.4. When the torpedo receives two signals with a five msec. pulse length 
within five seconds, KTorp enters the attack phase. (The noise in the environment is 
filtered by the sonar and these signals are certain to be generated by a potential target 
with a high probability) 
SS.5. In the attack phase, KTorp focuses on the potential signal source. In this 
mode, first the torpedo steers 7.5° right angle and navigates 150 yards. Then, KTorp will 
steer 15° left and 15° right angle after navigating 150 yards in each turn.  
SS.6. When the torpedo receives three signals with 2.5 msec. pulse length within 
three seconds, KTorp decides that the signal source is the real target and attacks the 
target.  
SS.7. If KTorp does not receive the signals specified in step SS.6 within one 
minute, it returns to the search phase.  
S.S.8. While KTorp is attacking the target, it follows a straight path until it 
destroys the target or the torpedo run ends. 
The illustration of a snake search pattern is given in Figures IV-2 and IV-3.  
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Figure IV-2. Snake Search Pattern Part 1 
 
Figure IV-3. Snake Search Pattern Part 2 
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2. Circular Search 
CS.1. KTorp will dive or rise to its search depth with a straight navigation path. 
KTorp is in the enable phase until it reaches enable distance. 
CS.2. When KTorp reaches the enable distance, it will arm itself and its sonar 
will become active. At this point, KTorp enters the search mode. 
CS.3. In the search phase, the navigation pattern of KTorp is exactly the same 
with snake search for the first 1000 yards. At this point, KTorp begins to circle by 
steering left. The approximate diameter of the search circle is 1,000 yards. KTorp steers 
2° left angle at every second. While circling, the torpedo dives with 7.5° down angle. 
After reaching the 2,000 ft depth limit, the torpedo rises to the search depth with 7.5° 
upwards angle and continues to circle. 
CS.4. In the search phase, when KTorp receives two signals with 2.5 msec. pulse 
length within four seconds, it enters the attack phase. 
CS.5. The navigation pattern in the attack phase is the same with the search 
phase as specified in step CS-3.  
CS.6.  When KTorp receives four signals with 2.5 msec. pulse length within two 
seconds, it decides that the signal source is a real target and attacks towards the location 
of the signal source.  
CS.7. If KTorp does not receive the signals specified in step 6, it returns to 
search phase.  
CS.8. While KTorp is attacking the target, it follows a straight path until it 
destroys the target or the torpedo run ends. 
The illustration of circular search pattern is given in Figures IV-4 and IV-5.  
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Figure IV-4. Circular Search Pattern Part 1 
 
Figure IV-5. Circular Search Pattern Part 2 
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F. HIGH LEVEL USE CASES 
Developing use cases is one of the most important activities defined by the 
Unified Process. Basically, they provide a starting point for analyzing and developing 
systems. A use case is a generalized scenario of a system’s particular functionality. A 
high level use case explains the system’s functionality by abstracting many details. A 
high level use case may be refined to provide more detail and understanding of the 
system’s behavior. Therefore, more refined use cases may be developed at different 
abstraction levels whenever necessary. In this case study, the focus is in high level. Thus, 
only high level use cases will be developed.  
As mentioned in the KTorp introduction, KTorp is a simplified version of similar 
real torpedo systems. Many features and specifications are abstracted. This study only 
focuses on the dynamic behavior of KTorp, which is searching and destroying the target. 
In fact, the logic design of the dynamic behavior is the one of the most challenging parts 
of torpedo designs. The correct implementation of this behavior is crucial for the torpedo 
system development. Therefore, only use cases relevant to dynamic behavior is included.  
At the highest level, two distinctive use cases can be easily identified. They are 
basically the two search modes of KTorp: Snake Search and Circular Search. The use 
cases also include the alternative steps because these use cases will provide the inputs to 
specify the system using TLCharts. Although it is simple, the use case diagram is 




Figure IV-6. Use Case Diagram of KTorp 
 
1. Snake Search Use Case 
Version: 1 
Modifications and Rationale from Previous Versions: None. 
Use Case Identifier and Name: UC-1, Snake Search 
Primary Actors: Target 
Priority: High-level primary and essential 
Preconditions:  
1.  The pre-launch torpedo system checks are normal. 
2.  The parameters for enable distance, search depth and snake search 
mode are successfully given to the torpedo by the fire control 
system. 
3.   The torpedo is configured for the snake search mode. 
4.  The torpedo is launched successfully from the mother ship.  
Postconditions: 
1.  The torpedo either destroys the target or the battery dies and the 







1.  After the launch, KTorp is in the enable phase. The torpedo dives 
or rises to the search depth. It is disarmed. The sonar and related 
devices are inactive. 
2.  The depth sensor, feeds the torpedo control logic with depth 
feedback throughout the complete run. 
3.   KTorp travels its enable distance in a straight line. 
4.  Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) feeds the distance traveled to the 
torpedo control logic. 
5.   KTorp continuously monitors the feedback from the IMU in order 
to satisfy safety requirements. 
6.  The Enabler sends the enable signal to the torpedo control logic 
when it reaches the predetermined enable distance. 
7.   The torpedo arms itself. The sonar and related devices become 
active. After these operations are completed, KTorp enters the 
search phase. 
8.   In the search phase, first KTorp steers 15° right. Then, it steers left 
and right with a 30° angle. After every turn, it navigates 300 yards. 
This movement continues until KTorp enters the attack phase. 
9.   The target in the environment generates signals. 
10.  The target signals are captured by the transceivers of KTorp 
throughout the torpedo run. 
11.  The noise in the environment creates signals similar to a target 
signature throughout the torpedo run.  
12.   The noise signals are captured by KTorp transceivers. 
13.   The torpedo analyzes the signals within the environment to 
determine if the signals are originated from a target or from the 
noise in the environment. 
14.   When KTorp receives two signals with five msec. pulse length 
within five seconds, it enters to the attack phase. 
15.   The torpedo concentrates its search and modifies its navigation 
pattern as follows: First KTorp steers 7.5° right. Then, it steers left 
and right with a 15° angle. After every turn, it navigates 300 yards. 
This movement continues until KTorp attacks the target. 
16.  When the torpedo receives three signals with 2.5 msec. pulse 
length within two seconds, KTorp switches to high speed and 




Alternative Flow of Actions: 
*16.   If KTorp does not receive the attack signal pattern (three signals 
with 2.5 msec. pulse length within two seconds) for one minute, 
KTorp will return to the step 8 (search phase) 
* Whenever the torpedo battery runs down, it will disarm itself.  
2. Circular Search Use Case 
Version: 1 
Modifications and Rationale from Previous Versions: None. 
Use Case Identifier and Name: UC-2, Circular Search 
Primary Actors: Target 
Priority: High-level primary and essential 
Preconditions:  
1.  The pre-launch torpedo system checks are normal. 
2.  The parameters for enable distance, search depth and snake search 
mode is successfully given to the torpedo by the fire control 
system. 
3.   The torpedo is configured for circular search mode. 
4.  The torpedo is launched successfully from the mother ship.  
Postconditions: 
1.  The torpedo either destroys the target or the battery dies and 
torpedo sinks silently. Unless KTorp hits the target, no explosion 
should occur. 
Main Scenario: 
1.  After launch, KTorp is in the enable phase. The torpedo dives or 
rises to the search depth. It is disarmed. The sonar and related 
devices are inactive. 
2.  The depth sensor, feeds the torpedo control logic with depth 
feedback throughout the complete run. 
3.   KTorp travels its enable distance in a straight line. 
4.  Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) feeds the distance traveled to the 
torpedo control logic. 
5.   KTorp continuously monitors the feedback from the IMU in order 
to satisfy safety requirements. 
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6.  The Enabler sends the enable signal to the torpedo control logic 
when it reaches the predetermined enable distance. 
7.   The torpedo arms itself. The sonar and related devices become 
active. After these operations are completed, KTorp enters into 
search phase. 
8.   In the first part of the search phase, the navigation pattern is the 
same with snake search mode for 1,000 yards. First, KTorp steers 
15° right. Then, it steers left and right with a 30° angle. After every 
turn, it navigates 300 yards. This movement continues until KTorp 
navigates 1,000 yards. 
9.   In the second part of search phase, KTorp begins circling. The 
diameter of the circles is 1,000 yards. The torpedo steers 2° right 
angle at every second. While circling, KTorp also dives with a 7.5° 
down angle. When it reaches the depth limit, which is 2,000 ft., 
KTorp begins to rise with a 7.5° upwards angle. This rising 
continues until KTorp reaches the upper depth limit, which is 35 ft. 
Then, the torpedo begins to dive again and this circling pattern 
continues until the torpedo goes for its final attack. 
10.   The target in the environment generates signals. 
11.  The target signals are captured by the transceivers of KTorp 
throughout the torpedo run. 
12.  The noise in the environment creates signals similar to a target 
signature throughout the torpedo run.  
13.   The noise signals are captured by KTorp transceivers. 
14.   The torpedo analyzes the signals within the environment to 
determine if the signals are originated from a target or from the 
noise in the environment. 
15.   When KTorp receives two signals with 2.5 msec. pulse length 
within four seconds, it enters into the attack phase. 
16.   In the attack phase, the torpedo concentrates its search but does not 
modify its navigation  pattern as in the snake search mode. When 
KTorp receives four signals with 2.5 msec. pulse length within two 
seconds, KTorp switches to high speed and attacks its target in a 
straight line. 
Alternative Flow of Actions: 
*16.   If KTorp does not receive the attack signal pattern (four signals 
with 2.5 msec. pulse length within two seconds) for one minute, 
KTorp will return to the step 9 (search phase) 
* Whenever the torpedo battery runs down, it will disarm itself.  
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G. SYSTEM SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS 
Developing system sequence diagrams is another important activity within the 
Unified Process. A system sequence diagram explains the interactions between objects at 
the system level. Its focus is in interactions incorporating the notion of time. High level 
use cases provide the necessary input to develop system sequence diagrams. They can 
either be used to model the generic interactions or specific instances of an interaction. 
Modeling generic interactions provides all possible paths whereas modeling specific 
instances of an interaction provides just one path through the interaction. In sequence 
diagrams, object instances are arranged horizontally and time runs vertically [41]. Two 
system sequence diagrams are developed for this case study at the highest level. Each of 
them explains one use case. Figure IV-7 shows the snake search sequence diagram and 




Figure IV-7. System Sequence Diagram for KTorp Snake Search 
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Today, almost every software development follows an iterative approach. This 
practice is also recognized in this study and several iterations are used to develop the 
KTorp statechart specification. 
In the first iteration, the system is analyzed at the highest level. Using natural 
language specifications provided earlier, the KTorp statechart specification should 
include four main states:  
• Enable_Phase State 
• Search_Phase State 
• Attack_Phase State 
• Final_Attack State 
Identifying the main states in a system is crucial for system statechart 
specification. Therefore at the highest level, the details of the specification are abstracted 
by substituting the events and the guards with the letters in the alphabet. The first 
iteration of the specification is shown in Figure IV-9. Note that this specification 
accounts for both search modes.  
KTorp has also safety-related requirements, which were listed earlier. For 
example, the safety-related natural language specification SR.5 is as follows:  
SR.5. KTorp is disarmed after 35 minutes of run time in any case.   
At the highest level, some of these safety-related requirements are incorporated in 
the highest level statechart by adding a transition from every main state labeled 
“E,F,G,H/Disarm”. E, F, G, and H are the necessary events and conditions. Disarm is the 
action simplified to represent all the tasks related to disarming the torpedo.  
In the second iteration, the snake search mode is analyzed. The statechart 
specification starts with “Enable_Phase” state. This phase is defined in natural language 
specification SS.1 as follows. 
SS.1. KTorp will dive or rise to its search depth with a straight navigation 




Figure IV-9. Highest Level Statechart Specification of KTorp 
 
“Enable_Phase” state is considered a simple state and it will not be discussed in 
detail in this study. The specification SS.1 and SS.2 provides the information necessary 
for identifying the substitute “A” in Figure IV-9. For the rest of the study, such 
substitutions can easily be identified when transitions between states are clarified.  
SS.2. When KTorp reaches the enable distance, it will arm itself and its sonar 
will become active. At this point, KTorp enters the search phase. 
The identified transition from the “Enable_Phase” state to the “Search_Phase” 
state is shown in Figure IV-10.  
67 
 
Figure IV-10. Transition between “Enable_Phase” State and “Search_Phase” State 
 
At this point, the “Search_Phase” is analyzed. It is recognized that there are two 
main spanning behaviors throughout the torpedo run. The first behavior is about the 
navigation of KTorp. The second behavior is the reception and analysis of the signals. 
These behaviors are represented by simple concurrent states within composite states. For 
example, using the natural language specification SS.3 and SS.4, the “Search_Phase” is 
identified as a composite state, including two concurrent states. These states are 
“Signal_Reception_of_5msec_Pulse_Length” and “Snake_Navigation_Pattern_Type_I”. 
In this study, to facilitate the understanding of the specification, long state names are 
used. State name “Snake_Navigation_Pattern_Type_I” denotes the behavior explained in 
SS.3.  
The natural language specification SS.3 and SS.4 are as follows. 
SS.3. In the search phase, KTorp’s navigation is just like a snake. First, KTorp 
will steer 15° right angle (“starboard” in Navy lingo) and navigates 300 yards. Then, 
KTorp will steer 30° left angle (“port” in Navy lingo) and 30° right angle after navigating 
300 yards in each turn. This pattern continues until KTorp enters the attack phase.  
SS.4. When the torpedo receives two signals with 5 msec. pulse length within 
five seconds, KTorp enters the attack phase. (The noise in the environment is filtered by 
the sonar and these signals are certain to be generated by a potential target with a high 
probability) 




Figure IV-11. Refinement of “Enable_Phase” Composite State for Snake Search Mode 
 
The second iteration continues with the first level refinement of the composite 
states. The composite states are “Search_Phase,” “Attack_Phase” and “Final_Attack”. 
The same refinement is also accomplished for the circular search mode. The composite 
state for “Search_Phase” in circular search mode is given in Figure IV-12.  
 
 
Figure IV-12. Refinement of “Enable_Phase” Composite State for Circular Search Mode 
 
At this point of the development, the general layout of the statechart 
specifications for two different search modes is outlined.  In the third iteration, the details 
of the specifications are under scope. Therefore, for each transition, events and guard 
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conditions are identified. If both search modes are analyzed, it will be seen that the 
transition from the “Enable_Phase” state to the “Search_Phase” state is the same for both 
modes. This is derived from the natural language specifications SS.1, SS.2, CS.1 and 
CS.2. 
The identified guards and events are highlighted. Figure IV-13 shows the 
transition. Earlier in the study, it is mentioned that the transitions will be identified. In 
Figure IV-9, the transition A corresponds to transition “Enable_Distance_Reached && 
Search_Depth_Reached / Arm && Activate_Sonar” in Figure IV-13.  
 
 
Figure IV-13. Transition between “Enable_Phase” State and “Search_Phase” State 
 
Then, the iteration continues with analyzing snake search mode. The transitions 
are derived from the natural language specifications and Snake Search use case (UC-1). 
The highlighted portion of the specification SS.4 gives the necessary information for the 
transition. 
SS.4. When the torpedo receives two signals with five msec. pulse length 
within five seconds, KTorp enters attack phase. 
Since the pulse length for the signals are the same, it is assumed that the received 
signals satisfy this condition. This assumption will simplify the statechart specification at 
this point. Signals with other pulse lengths will not satisfy the necessary guard 
conditions. The transition from the “Search_Phase” state to the “Attack_Phase” state is 
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accomplished as shown in Figure IV-14. Note that a temporary state is added to the 
statechart specification. 
The same approach used in the refinement of the “Search_Phase” composite state 
is applied to the “Attack_Phase” state. The navigation pattern described in SS.5 is called 
“Snake_Navigation_Pattern_Type_II”. 
SS.5. In the attack phase, KTorp focuses on the potential signal source. In this 
mode, first the torpedo steers 7.5° right angle and navigates 150 yards. Then, KTorp will 
steer 15° left and 15° right angle after navigating 150 yards in each turn.  
 
 
Figure IV-14. Transition from “Search_Phase” State to “Attack_Phase” State 
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SS.6. When the torpedo receives three signals with 2.5 msec. pulse length 
within three seconds, KTorp decides that the signal source is a real target and attacks the 
target.  
Using natural language specification SS.5 and SS.6 and Snake Search use case 
(UC-1), the refinement of the “Attack_Phase” is achieved as shown in Figure IV-15. The 
behavior specified in SS.6 is called “Signal_Reception_of_2.5msec._Pulse_Length”.  
At this point of the development, it is observed that achieving the specification 
with deterministic Harel statecharts causes some problems. An attempt to specify the 
behavior outlined in SS.6 with deterministic Harel statecharts is shown in Figure IV-16. 
 
Figure IV-15. Refinement of “Attack_Phase” Composite State for Snake Search Mode 
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Figure IV-16. An Attempt to Achieve “Attack_Phase” Composite State for Snake Search 
Mode 
 
At first, the statechart given in Figure IV-16 may seem to reflect the behavior 




Figure IV-17. Sliding Window Problem 
 
Figure IV-17 represents a simple scenario for the attack phase. The signals are 
arriving randomly. The problem is that even though the arriving pattern of signals 
satisfies the necessary condition, the deterministic Harel statechart given in Figure IV-16 
will not recognize the pattern. First, the implementation will look into the first window 
and return to temporary state 1. Then, the implementation will look into the third 
window. Still, the pattern will be seen as unsatisfactory for the condition. However, when 
a second window is captured from the pattern, it will be observed that this window 
satisfies the condition. This window will not be recognized by the deterministic Harel 
statechart given in Figure IV-16. 
Figure IV-18 shows a deterministic Harel statechart specification for the 
requirement SS.6. In this statechart, two timers are used to capture the second window 




Figure IV-18. Deterministic Harel Statechart Specification for the Requirement SS.6 
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The deterministic Harel statechart given in Figure IV-18 uses two different timers 
to keep track of the sliding windows shown in Figure IV-17. If the requirement SS.6 
required more than 3 signals, the deterministic Harel statechart would have been more 
complex. The number of the timers and the number of windows that needs to be observed 
will increase. Such requirements necessitate more states and complex specifications with 
deterministic Harel statecharts.  
At this point, a non-deterministic approach will be used to specify the requirement 
given with SS.6. Non-determinism will overcome the difficulties mentioned as the sliding 
window problem. A simple TLChart will capture the requirement. Figure IV-19 shows 
the assertion statechart for the specification of the requirement. Later, this assertion 
statechart will be added to the primary statechart. This assertion is called “Assertion1”. 
 




In Figure IV-19, there are two transitions labeled “Signal_Received” leaving from 
temporary state 2. This is how non-determinism is used. Such transitions may create 
ambiguity during execution on a deterministic computer. TLCharts overcome the 
ambiguity using a priority scheme. Transitions that lead to a good state (in the figure, the 
good state is the state Done) have a higher priority during execution. Other transitions 
with the same condition have lesser priority. Priorities are shown in the upper corner of 
the states for the sake of clarity. Normally, these priorities are not added to the 
specification. They are handled internally by the tool used to process the TLChart. 
Temporary state 2 and 3 have lesser priority than Done state. The smaller the number is, 
the less priority the computation has. When priorities are the same, a random selection 
can be made or however the implementation of the tool enforces.   
The natural language requirement SS.7 also needs to be added to the specification. 
This requirement adds a time limit for the attack search phase, which is defined in 
requirement SS.6. The requirement SS.7 is as follows. 
SS.7. If KTorp does not receive the signals specified in step 6 within one 
minute, it returns to the search phase. 
The non-deterministic statechart shown in Figure IV-19 is embedded in the 





Figure IV-20. Primary Statechart Specification for Attack Phase 
 
Adding such requirements as assertions to the overall statechart specifications has 
some advantages. These advantages will be discussed later.  
The Final Attack phase is described with requirement SS.8. The requirement is as 
follows. 
SS.8. While KTorp is attacking the target, it follows a straight path until it 
destroys the target or the torpedo run ends. 
The final attack phase will be specified with only one simple state shown in 
Figure IV-20.  
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At this point, the specification process is finalized for the purpose of this study. 
The goal of this study was to show that the use of TLCharts when using deterministic 
Harel statecharts is inefficient. Non-determinism is an important part of TLCharts. Every 
requirement that can be specified with non-deterministic statecharts, can also be specified 
with deterministic Harel statecharts. However, the number of states increases 
exponentially. The development of such statecharts will be costly. Using non-
determinism generally provides an efficient specification when compared to not using it. 
TLCharts also enables the use of temporal logic conditioned transitions within the 
specification. Drusinsky [37] states that 
TLCharts visually and intuitively resemble Harel statecharts while 
enabling temporal-logic conditioned transitions. This is useful for the 
specifying of non-deterministic temporal properties inside a statechart 
specification, thereby combining the simple and familiar statechart 
notation with temporal logic ability to capture negation and non-
determinism. 
As a result, the final statechart specifications will arguably be easier to 
understand, read, and maintain.  
In this study, KTorp is used as the example.  KTorp is a close example of real 
torpedoes. While developing KTorp statecharts, it is shown that using deterministic Harel 
statecharts may cause some problems mentioned as the sliding window problem. 
TLCharts with non-determinism solves the problems as shown in Figure IV-20.   
I. ASSERTIONS 
An assertion is generally defined as a programming language construct that 
checks whether an expression is true. For many years, programmers used assertions in 
order to simplify debugging throughout development. Most widely-used programming 
languages have mechanisms for assertions. The use of assertions is more widespread 
now. Today, assertions are also used for specification verification purposes.  
Formal specification assertions can be used with Run-time Execution Monitoring 
(REM) in order to track the temporal behavior of an underlying application. REM 
methods range from printing messages to run-time tracking of complex formal 
requirements for verification purposes. Such methods have recently been used by NASA 
for the Deep Impact project [38].   
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Published REM methods generally use temporal logic as a specification language. 
Conventionally, run-time verification methods have been used in the later stages of the 
design to validate and debug the code. Correctness assertions are written and used for 
REM-based testing or for model checking. These are called test-time assertions. 
Drusinsky, Shing and Demir recently presented two more additional assertion types [3]: 
• Assertions that are used only during simulation  
• Deployable assertions integrated with the run-time control flow of the 
target software 
Test-time assertions are used for testing the correctness of the design or the 
implementation or both. Assertions that are used only during simulation are called 
simulation-time assertions. These assertions use the information about the environment 
that is not present in run-time.  Deployable assertions integrated with the run-time control 
flow of the target software are called run-time assertions. These assertions are embedded 
in the application. The assertion will check whether a requirement is violated in run-time. 
When the requirement is violated, the assertion affects the control flow of the software 
via an exception handling routine.  
A deployable assertion example is given in Figure IV-21. The figure shows a 
TLChart version of the statechart shown in Figure IV-9, where the additional transition 
from Attack_Phase to Search_Phase will force the torpedo control software to switch 
back to Search_Phase if the temporal proposition ( >1 min (in Final_Attack)) evaluates 
true.  
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Figure IV-21. Highest Level TLChart Specification of KTorp with a Temporal Logic 
Conditioned Transition 
 
Note that the temporal logic conditioned transition corresponds to substitute C in 
Figure IV-9. 
Further details about assertion types with examples can be found in [3].  
In the development of KTorp specification, the requirement SS.6 is integrated into 
the primary statechart as an assertion statechart. This assertion could also be written in 
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temporal logic. However, the belief is that using the same specification language for both 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
The scope of this thesis was to investigate the suitability of TLCharts, a 
specification language that combines statecharts and temporal logic, for the early 
specification of dynamic characteristics of a homing torpedo. The homing torpedo 
example, KTorp, made it possible to analyze TLCharts in a weapons systems software 
context. TLCharts is a recently-proposed specification language. Therefore, the belief 
was that such analysis will help in understanding the advantages and/or disadvantages of 
using TLCharts for the early specification of systems. In order to achieve this goal, 
KTorp was specified using a systematic software development process. First, KTorp was 
conceived and defined using natural language specifications. The development of use 
cases and system sequence diagrams followed natural language specifications. The early 
specification process was finalized with statechart specifications. 
Software development starts in the minds of developers. Then, the ideas turn into 
natural language specifications. The process follows with early specifications and 
continues further. Every transformation of information increases the possibility of error. 
Therefore, some form of verification is required after every transformation. Barry Boehm 
pointed out that the cost of fixing an error occurred in early stages increases as the project 
progresses. Every day, computer-aided development tools are getting better and new 
tools are being developed. Complex specifications in temporal logic, in statecharts, or in 
other specification languages can be analyzed and evaluated with these tools. However, it 
should not be forgotten that the process, especially early stages, still heavily depends on 
human intervention. Thus, the specification language used for early stages must be 
intuitive, logical, easy to understand, write and modify. TLCharts is an attempt to answer 
such questions.      
TLCharts is a visual specification language that combines the visual and intuitive 
appeal of non-deterministic Harel statecharts with formal specifications written in Linear-
time Temporal Logic (LTL) [37]. Harel statecharts are visual and deterministic. Linear-
time temporal logic is textual/logical and non-deterministic. TLCharts combine both 
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formalisms which makes it possible to create specifications that are visual, partially 
deterministic and at the same time logical and non-deterministic. Both highly nested 
temporal logic conditions in a single state specification and a fully-deterministic, 
implementation level detailed Harel statechart specification are legal TLCharts. However, 
such use only abuses the purpose of TLCharts. [37] 
In the KTorp example, the statechart specification started with deterministic Harel 
statecharts, which is in fact a legal TLChart. During the specification process, it is 
observed that to specify some system requirements with fully deterministic Harel 
statecharts may be inefficient. One example is given and explained as the sliding window 
problem. The requirements in the form of some events within a limited amount of time 
cannot easily be specified and verified with deterministic Harel statecharts. A non-
deterministic solution is simpler and easier to understand. If Figures IV-16, IV-18 and 
IV-19 are compared, it will be observed that Figure IV-19 has fever states and transitions. 
Also, Figure IV-19 requires less time to understand. The author spent a considerable 
amount of time to derive with a deterministic solution. This experience demonstrated 
when some of the requirements are heavily dependent on time, and that specification and 
verification of those requirements with TLCharts are easier to develop.   
My belief is that TLCharts is a powerful tool for early specification. The 
specification language has powerful features such as visual appeal of statecharts, non-
determinism, and enabling temporal-logic conditioned transitions. It even allows us to 
use natural language conditioned transitions [37]. Drusinsky and Shing [36] provided an 
example on using TLCharts for armor-plating specifications.  I agree with Drusinsky’s 
warning: “Clearly, TLCharts can be abused.” [37]. While using the features of the 
formalism, the developers should not forget the goal, which is creating clear, easily 
understandable and maintainable specifications. The features should be used when 
necessary.      
Weapons systems software development is an expensive process. It takes a long 
time and considerable effort throughout the life cycle of the system. The major part of 
global software production occurs in the United States. A significant portion of this 
production is sponsored by the Department of Defense. Numerous reports indicate that 
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most of the projects could not be completed or used effectively due to various reasons.  
Every effort to improve software production will be extremely beneficial. The study aims 
to contribute with an analysis of newly-proposed specification language in a special 
context. As a result, this thesis demonstrated that using TLCharts as the early 
specification language for weapon systems software provides efficient, visual and 
intuitive specifications.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
TLCharts also makes it possible to use temporal-logic conditioned transitions. 
However, in this thesis, the KTorp example did not require such use. There are two 
reasons. First, the example was simplified and did not include complex requirements. 
Second, including examples with temporal-logic conditioned transitions will 
unnecessarily broaden the subject for one thesis study. Also, the KTorp example with its 
current form is hard to understand for unfamiliar readers. A follow-up study may be the 
analysis of “just in time temporal logic” property of TLCharts.  
Safety requirements are of utmost importance for weapon systems software. 
These safety requirements are generally in the form of what the system must not do. 
TLCharts provides an opportunity for armor-plating specifications. It is achieved via 
over-specification of a fully specified design with temporal logic conditions to strengthen 
the safety of the system. Such a concept is introduced with an example in [36]. A follow-
up study may answer the questions of when and how much armor-plating is useful.   
The formalism should be supported with the necessary tools. Otherwise, it will 
only stay as another proposed formalism in the literature. After the necessary tools are in 
place, the software developers will have a chance to apply TLCharts in their projects. The 
true evaluation of applying TLCharts will only be revealed after experience in real 
projects. Currently, there are two separate tools called DBRover and Temporal Rover 
developed by Time-Rover Inc [38].  These tools may be analyzed and tested with an 
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